Cooperative innovation of heterogeneous population is more and more important in regional innovation ecosystem, and cross-border cooperation has become one of the effective ways to break through the predicament of ecological niche development. However, the existence of opportunistic behavior will restrain the cooperation motivation among the main communities and threaten the stability of the ecosystem population cooperation network. In order to avoid possible speculation, participants tend to make commitments beforehand. However, how can the commitment effectively avoid partner speculation so as to improve cooperation performance? In this paper, we will study the community game strategy of main body in innovation under multivariate uncertainty, and analyze the impact of commitment on collaborative innovation action.
Introduction
At present, with the power of the Internet, industrial production is gradually shifted from centralized control to decentralized control, and the ecosystem collaborative innovation and network manufacturing emerge as a result. Taking advantages of Internet platform's cross time and space, without borders, and promoting sharing characters, the main innovation communities realize integration of resources within and between enterprises, promote the manufacture of innovative products to achieve industrial cooperation, thus witnessing collaborative In the regional innovation ecosystem, certain collaborative innovation ecological network will be formed, and the innovation industry chain and value chain alliance will be derived. Because of its complementary resources, cost sharing, risk sharing and synergistic effects [1] , technological innovation network has gradually been adopted by more and more enterprises. According to the main body of innovation, innovation network membership can be divided into two categories: one is horizontal cooperation among homogeneous competitors in the same industry; the other is cross industry heterogeneous vertical cooperation. As Geroski [2] puts it, the latter is more common because it can avoid fierce competition and market collusion. For example, the main body of regional innovation community, TOYOTA automobile establishes a close vertical cooperation network [3] with the upstream. In fact, the innovation process in a community formed by main body of innovation within the regional innovation ecosystem is a process of long-term interest game, relationship management and technology evolution. Although the starting point of cooperation is common interests, the risks during innovation may change the original intention, thus one party may take advantage and ignore the partner's interests. In the process of cooperation, there are the risks of uncertain market pricing and manufacturing cost, as well as the risk of technological innovation. Facing the uncertainty of cost and technology, what enterprises can do is to minimize their adverse effects as much as possible. Therefore, it is very necessary to establish a stable and effective prior commitment. The commitment can be expressed in different forms, such as written contracts or informal agreements.
In recent years, research on technology innovation, cooperation and uncertainty in regional innovation ecosystem has emerged gradually both home and abroad. First of all, in vertical cooperation, Harabi [4] analyzes the impact of Regional Innovation Alliance on enterprise innovation. Handfield [5] and others pointed out that industrial chain R & D is of great importance in reducing costs.
Chen Yuke [6] and his partners found that upstream participation in innovation can not only improve the member's profit within the alliance, but also is beneficial to the downstream non-member enterprises. Second, new progresses have also been made in the study of uncertainty in innovation. For example, Dixit [7] analyzed the impact of uncertainty on business investment, pointing out that the greater the uncertainty of investment, the smaller the willingness to invest, while Helm and Kloyer [8] have targeted analysis on the transaction risk in upstream and downstream R & D cooperation. Sun Caihong, Yu Hui and others [9] studied the existence and evolution of opportunism. Brander and Spencer [10] began L. Lei, S. Wei American Journal of Industrial and Business Management to focus on commitment rather early, and they used definite function relationship to analyze commitment of horizontal joint R & D. Banerjee and Lin [11] studied the impact of constant price commitments on R & D activities. Sun Guoyan [12] and his partners believe that if manufacturers keep the price flexible and promised price, Internet plus integrated enterprises will invest more in innovation and have higher sales expectation. While Feng Hua [13] and colleagues did enterprise cooperation research, pointing out that if the manufacturer implements transfer pricing commitment strategy, it can make Internet plus integrated enterprises invest more in innovation. Gilbert, Cvsa (2003) [14] and Kim, Netessine (2013) [15] have studied the topic. But up to now, there is still little research on the commitment game in innovation.
R & D innovation cooperation is a long-term process, although the starting point of cooperation is good, but the market is changing rapidly, and the process of cooperation is susceptible to various factors. With the development of innovation chain and industry chain, R & D cycle will be lengthened accordingly, and its uncertainty will also be enlarged. In recent years, research on innovation, although there are a lot of uncertainty, but the studies on the innovation of community cooperation of the regional innovation ecosystem are still insufficient; especially in the innovation alliance of uncertainty, the existing research results in qualitative, quantitative research is rare, or just for an uncertainty study.
Then, in the face of these uncertain uncertainties, how can we make decisions to ensure the effectiveness of cooperation and safeguard our own interests? This is the focus of this study. Therefore, this study will be the most frequently encountered innovation alliance Regional Innovation Ecosystem in the technical and cost uncertainty quantification study, multivariate decision problems under uncertainty, innovation chain and industrial chain alliance.
The Three-Stage Game Model of Cooperation Innovation
This paper studies the R & D cooperation between a manufacturer and an Internet plus integrated enterprise. The manufacturer supply new key components to the Internet plus integrated enterprise, and the enterprise will process the components into products and marketing them. For the sake of generality, we assume that a component corresponds to a new product.
The joint innovation of enterprises and the production and marketing activities after are divided into three stages: the commitment stage of cooperation, the stage of collaborative innovation, and the stage of manufacturing and marketing.
The evolution of each stage is shown in Figure 1 , where the virtual arrow indicates that the information associated with uncertainty is observed.
The commitment stage, integrated enterprises and manufacturers jointly develop cooperation agreement, determine their investment in innovation, and make commitment on the price of components and the production scale of integrated enterprises (can be controlled by the new product pricing). This is also In this paper, Cobb Douglas Production Function is used to describe the synergy of cross-industry resources complementary. Innovation output is affected by three factors, the upstream innovation level x, the downstream innovation level y and the joint innovation capability θ used to characterize technological uncertainty. Suppose that the level of output which is used to measure the size of the potential demand for a new product after the success of innovation is I xy θ = , θ is a random variable on a given interval, and 
In the function, λ is a non negative parameter, which represents the ratio of demand in accordance with the price.
Action without Commitment
Non-commitment means the two sides only reached a consensus on cooperation matters and did not specify the orders and prices in the early stage of cooperation. Here the analysis starts from the third stage, using backward induction. η θ θ λ η θ = − . The second stage: because the Internet plus integrated enterprise is responsible for marketing new products, so they have more and more accurate assessment to the demand for new products. For simplicity, assume that the enterprise's private information is public knowledge. Then, the manufacturer's expected benefit is ( )
E θ π equals to mathematical expectation to θ from π . Given that 
Main Action under the Commitments
As the innovation cycle is generally longer and of high uncertainty, the cost of a fixed price commitment is high and the risks great, and the flexibility of innovation chain management is reduced. Therefore, this paper proposes the concept of condition-dependent commitment, that is, the commitment of production and marketing stage depends on the state of innovation stage.
At the beginning of cooperation, the two sides give promise to investment in innovation, while the manufacturer offers price of components to the Internet plus integrated enterprise and the enterprise promises order to manufacturer.
Due to the rapidly changing market environment, the cost of the components and the demand for new products in the early stage can not be accurately predicted, and unconditional commitment could not reduce the impact of uncertainty on cooperation and avoid speculation, so condition-dependent commitment mechanism should be considered. It means the both sides first determine innovation investment, on which component price depends, and the production scale of the Internet plus integrated enterprise depends on the upstream price and the innovation investment.
For the two parties cannot observe the following information at the commitment stage, they will have price negotiations. As a result of the influence of the decision state, the quantity of the order d is mainly dependent on , , According to the expression (2), the first part of the upstream and downstream profit expression is independent of the variance of the random variable.
Therefore, this paper divides the profit without commitment into two parts: one is the average profit which is non speculative profit unrelated to the variance, the other is speculative opportunity profit, related to the fluctuation of random variables. With a commitment, there is no opportunity profit for the speculations of both sides are avoided. If the opportunity profit is not taken into account, the profits of both sides are greater than the average profits without commitment (see the following theorem). But if opportunity profit brought by uncertainty of technology and cost is larger, there may be the case that overall profit of enterprises without commitment is higher than that with one. It won't be the optimal decision for Internet plus integrated enterprises and manufacturers to follow the commitment. This can be concluded to the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Condition-dependent commitment can increase the profits of non-speculative behavior of members in an alliance.
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Numerical Analysis
In order to understand the above models and conclusions, the corresponding numerical experimental results and the analysis process are listed here. Give pa- (1) is to ensure that the demand for new product is not negative, and the marginal profit of the new product is above 0. For it is a market for new product, assume that there is no alternative product on the market. Therefore, the purchase of such products from the market is not considered, that is, the case 0 d < is not included. Condition 2) is to ensure that the profit of the enterprises is positive. This condition mainly discusses the impact of cost changes on innovation inputs and profits of both sides.
1) Whether condition-dependent commitment or not, the upstream and downstream innovation inputs increase with the growth of production costs. Low cost strategy is the key to win a place in a competitive market. Especially, when the production costs are too high, enterprises will be more willing to reduce costs. If they quantify this intention as innovation investment, we can see that the innovation investment will increase with the growth of production cost.
2) When the mean value and standard deviation are certain, the innovation investment with commitment is higher than that without commitment. This diagram also illustrates that condition-dependent commitment promotes increased innovation inputs from both partners. And with the increase of the cost mean 1 µ , there is a growing gap between the commitment investment and the investment without.
3) When there is a condition-dependent commitment, the proportion of investment in cooperative R & D is larger than that without commitment. This is also consistent with the condition
shown in Theorem 4, and the stimulation to upstream innovation input is more effective.
Suppose that the manufacturer's production cost is certain, the change of collaborative innovation effect is related to the mean and variance of joint innovation capability. First, the influence of uncertainty. We can see from Figure 2 : (1) For any given 2 σ , the output is higher when commitment is given than without. This is due to the condition-dependent commitment, which reduces the risks associated with the uncertainty of joint technological innovation, thus 2 2 xy xy µ µ >  ; (2) when variance 2 0 σ = , the technical uncertainty which is similar to the joint innovation, is eliminated. At this point, xy in the two situations are equal. Moreover, when 2 σ increases gradually, the risks of non-commitment grows, and the output decreases. As a result, as the standard deviation increases, output gab between condition-dependent commitment and non-commitment is also enlarging.
We can see from Figure 3 , the effect of collaborative innovation varies with the mean cost of manufacturer when there is condition-dependent commitment and no commitment. When the joint innovation capability is certain, commitment or not, xy increases with the growth of 1 µ . At the same time, the upstream and downstream innovation inputs are greater than those without commitment commitments, so the xy with commitment is greater than that without, which means that the output level of condition-dependent commitment is greater too.
We can see from Figure 4 , the relationship between xy and 2 µ . When joint innovation capability is certain, xy with commitment is greater than without, the same with the output. Moreover, if the joint innovation capability of a coalition is stronger, the corresponding innovation investment equilibrium will be less, and the two will be inversely related. by non-commitment will exceed the profit without commitment. As a result, manufacturers are more willing to choose non-commitment circumstances.
In Figure 6 there is change of profit for Internet plus integrated enterprise with and without commitment. Similarly, whether the Internet plus integrated enterprises will choose to keep the commitment depends on its profit. Figure 7 shows the indifferent curves for the upstream and downstream profit in the two circumstances. Take the manufacturer for example, in the lower right of the line We can see from Figure 7 , when in C area, both the manufacturer and the Internet plus integrated enterprise have speculation motivation, and the integrated enterprise is even more inclined to non-commitment cooperation. It is also in accordance with the decision-making order in practical cooperation. The integrated enterprise is the subsequent decision-maker, when they find that manufacturer choose speculation, they will not continue to comply with the commitment. In order to ensure their own interests, the integrated enterprise will adjust strategy for maximal interests. And, both parties will benefit from not following the commitment, and the overall interests of the supply chain will also increase.
When the Internet plus integrated enterprise do not have speculative motive, manufacturer often will keep the commitment as shown in the B region. But if cooperation falls in region A, the manufacturer will benefit more from commitment cooperation, while the Internet plus integrated enterprise is possible to speculation, and the cooperation will be unstable. If the Internet plus integrated enterprise do not keep the promise, the manufacturer's profit will be damaged.
Conclusions
Taking regional innovation ecosystem as the background, the Internet plus integrated enterprise and manufacturer collaborative innovation as an example, the article systematically analyzes commitment cooperation and competitive strategy of joint innovation of enterprises when cost and technology are not certain.
This paper focuses on the impact of cost uncertainty on technological innovation ecological networks, and proposes the concept of condition-dependent commitment. The study finds that the condition-dependent commitment mechanism is beneficial to promote the innovation input from both sides, and increase the output of cooperative innovation and the interests of both partners.
Although to some extents, commitment can guarantee a long-term and stable cooperation, there is still possible speculation. In order to avoid damage to partner's interests by the other's speculation, and to ensure the credibility of the commitment, effective punishment mechanism should also be included in the commitment. Further discussions are needed in terms of how to set punishment conditions and penalties, and how to compare the effects of different punishment mechanisms under a given mechanism.
In this study, we study the impact of multiple uncertainties on Collaborative The first necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium is: x y x y <   , therefore, state dependent commitments increase the profits of both partners.
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